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Abstract
We consider the problem of control of access to a firm’s productive asset, em-
bedding the decision makers into a structure of formal authority relationships.
Within such a structure, decision makers act as principal to some decision mak-
ers, while they act as agent to other decision makers. We study under which
conditions decision makers exercise their own authority and accept their superi-
ors’ authority.
We distinguish two types of behavior. First, we investigate a non-cooperative
equilibrium concept describing explicit exercise of authority. Second, we con-
sider the possibility of subordinates to submit themselves to authority even though
such authority is not enforced explicitly.
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1 Exercising authority
In this paper we develop an alternative approach to modelling the use and enforce-
ment of formal authority within a given hierarchical production organization. We
focus our investigations on the various forms of enforcing or exercising authority in
a given formal authority structure that regulates the access of agents to a productive
asset. The authority structure can be of arbitrary complexity in our approach.
In contemporary literature on the firm, the nature of authority in (hierarchical)
production organizations is a major field of investigation. Since the seminal contri-
butions of Coase [10], Simon [44], Williamson [46, 47], Grossman and Hart [18],
and Hart and Moore [23] the literature has mainly developed towards a theory of in-
complete contracting which tries to explain the formation of firms from the ownership
over residual rights, i.e., rights that are not contractible1. One of the main limitations
of this theory is that it mostly studies situations with a rather limited number of au-
thority relationships. Another problem with this approach is the focus on ownership.
As Rajan and Zingales [37] put it: “The property rights view does not consider em-
ployees’ part of the firm because, given that employees cannot be owned, there is no
sense in which they are any different from agents who contract with the firm at arm’s
length”.
Following Rajan and Zingales [37] we place the control of access to a productive
asset at the center of our investigations and, thus, of our model of enforcing formal
authority within a production organization. We pursue an alternative approach, ex-
plicitly allowing arbitrarily complex structures of formal authority relationships using
deterministic concepts from noncooperative as well as cooperative game theory and
the theory of social situations (Greenberg [17]). We explicitly assume a given en-
vironment consisting of a fixed set of agents2, a productive asset, and a structure
of formal authority relationships between these agents regulating the control of the
access to the productive asset. We view such a formal authority relationship as be-
tween a “superior” and a “subordinate”. The superior is assumed to have the power
to control the access of the subordinate to the productive asset. Our formal theory is
now based on three primitives:
(1) a description of the productive values that can be generated by the different
teams of agents through accessing the productive asset,
(2) a structure of formal authority relationships which represents the distribution
of the power to regulate the access of individual agents to the productive asset,
and
1For recent developments regarding the theory of incomplete contracting and its foundations we
refer to Maskin and Tirole [32] and Hart and Moore [24].
2Throughout this paper we use the term “agent” synonymously with the standard notion of an
“economic actor”. Hence, unless stated explicitly, an agent does not refer to an agent as in a principal-
agent relationship.
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(3) a utility structure describing the preferences of the agents over the different
production situations.
We give a short description of each of these primitives.
First, following the seminal work of Alchian and Demsetz [2], we assume that pro-
duction is in principle a collective effort. Teams of agents access the productive asset
and generate a collective production value3. Formally, the potential collective output
values of the different teams are represented by a cooperative game with transferable
utility. This is also the modelling principle of the literature quoted. We assume that
these productive capacities are completely independent of the regulation of a team’s
access to the productive asset of the firm. In that respect these output values only
have a potential nature.
Second, we introduce an arbitrarily complex structure of formal authority rela-
tionships. Our main hypothesis is that one has to distinguish “authority” itself from
the deliberate enforcement of authority, or “enforced authority”. Following Aghion
and Tirole [1] we define formal authority of an individual as the formal contracted
right of that individual to control the access of certain other individual agents to the
firm’s asset. Hence, within a formal authority relationship we distinguish one supe-
rior and one subordinate such that the superior has the right to control the access to
the productive asset by the subordinate. An agent is usually a superior to one or more
subordinates, but is herself possibly also a subordinate to one or more superiors. In
this regard individual agents within an authority structure are “relative principals” as
well as “relative agents” in the sense of a regular principal-agent relationship.
This implies that a team has to obtain some form of permission from the supe-
riors of the members of the team before it has access to the firm’s productive asset.
We assume that such permission is only required if formal authority relationships
are “enforced” by the various superiors of members of the team. If authority is not
enforced, in principle such authority has not to be granted.
Here, we define authority to be enforced when costs are incurred to monitor cer-
tain subordinates with the aim to actually regulate or control their access to the firm’s
asset. When an individual agent — as a relative principal or superior within the for-
mal authority structure — decides to enforce her formal authority over some of her
subordinates, she engages in monitoring to detect whether a subordinate pursues
unauthorized access to the firm’s asset. This implies that in principle enforcing au-
thority is costly. If a subordinate does not assume the objectives of the superior, the
superior can ultimately sanction that subordinate by firing him, i.e., the superior can
deny that subordinate access to the firm’s productive asset.
3To support the hypothesis that team production is collective, we quote Alchian and Demsetz [2],
page 779: “With team production it is difficult, solely by observing total output, to either define or
determine each individual’s contribution to this output of the cooperating units.” For a more elaborate
discussion we also refer to Hart and Moore [23] and Ichiishi [26].
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Throughout this paper we assume that the incurred costs of monitoring are uni-
form. Furthermore, we simplify the setting by assuming that monitoring is perfect.
This allows us to handle the enforcement of authority in a completely determinis-
tic fashion and to analyze situations with an arbitrarily complex authority structure.
Extension to imperfect monitoring is left for future research, which requires the ap-
plication of game theoretic models of incomplete and imperfect information.
Third, we introduce a utility structure describing the motivations of the agents
within the firm. Our main hypothesis is that the individual utilities are completely
determined by the output values that are realized by the various teams of agents
within the firm. Each individual agent is assumed to participate voluntarily in these
value-generating teams and shares in these values. Hence, we assume that the exer-
cise of authority itself has no direct externalities. It only has indirect consequences
on the utility levels generated through changes in the realized output values after
modification of the enforcement of authority by denying certain agents access to the
productive asset.
We distinguish notions of formal as well as enforced authority. At the heart of our
study is the game theoretic analysis of the strategic decision making processes whether
to enforce the assigned formal authority or not. We recall that the concept of for-
mal authority is represented by the given structure of formal authority relationships
between the agents. For each formal authority relationship it can now be decided
whether it should be enforced or not. In our framework the strategic enforcement
of authority is developed into two fundamentally different fashions: the explicit and
latent enforcement of authority.
Explicit enforcement of authority is the willful or strategic decision to enforce the
formal authority to control the access of a subordinate to the firm’s productive asset.
As indicated, this is done by monitoring the subordinate, thereby incurring monitor-
ing costs. Our model of explicit authority is developed as a non-cooperative strategic
or normal form authority game. Each individual agent selects which subordinates
to monitor within the formal authority structure. This leads to a certain structure
of enforced formal authority relationships. Monitoring costs are taken into account
and determine together with the properties of the utility function of the individual
whether enforcing formal authority is profitable for an individual or not. The result-
ing Nash equilibria describe the individually stable structures of explicitly enforced
(formal) authority relationships. Under certain conditions we show that complete
exercise of formal authority is warranted under low enough monitoring costs. This is
as one would expect.
Latent authority comes about in situations where rational subordinates take into
account the abilities of a superior to exercise their formal authority explicitly by
engaging in monitoring. Latent authority is exercised if the (rational) subordinate
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voluntarily behaves as if his access to the firm’s productive asset were monitored ex-
plicitly by his superior, even though there is no actual monitoring taking place, and,
thus, formal authority is not explicitly enforced by his superior. Obviously, under
latent authority, social gains are generated since one does not have to pay the moni-
toring costs. Therefore, latent authority is socially preferable over explicit authority.
Our model of latent authority is developed as a social situation in the sense of Green-
berg [17]. This model describes a more advanced standard of behavior that results
into latent authority. Every situation in which agents have decided which authority
relationships they explicitly enforce describes a state. A veto correspondence then
describes how agents can induce one state from another. This veto correspondence
reflects the fact that agents can only once announce which authority relationships
they explicitly enforce. The equilibrium concept that we apply here is the stable au-
thority protocol which satisfies certain internal and external stability notions. The
model of latent authority can be considered to be a formal construction to explain
the elusive concept of “loyalty”.
The analysis of latent authority leads to some surprising insights. In case some
formal authority is not enforced explicitly, subordinates may act as if such authority
is enacted fully. This approach is based on the insight that superiors can induce states
in which certain subordinates are monitored. Sufficiently rational subordinates now
correctly anticipate under which conditions monitoring will be induced by their su-
periors. Given these correct beliefs, all subordinates may voluntarily act as if they are
fully monitored even though that might not be the case. We show that if monitoring
costs are sufficiently low, in the equilibrium state subordinates will voluntarily submit
to full authority, i.e., a state of full latent authority emerges. Hence, this approach
provides an alternative foundation for the phenomenon that formal authority need
not be exercised explicitly in order to be effective, confirming the main insight from
standard principal-agent theory which is based on the analysis of much simpler au-
thority situations. Moreover, for some range of monitoring costs we see that latent
authority might be exercised while explicit authority is not.
These main insights for these two fundamentally different models of “real” au-
thority — in the sense of Aghion and Tirole [1] — are established under a single
condition on the utility structure denoted as dual monotonicity. This is a relatively
mild condition on the utility structure that is satisfied by most known solution con-
cepts in cooperative game theory. We provide a comparison of this condition to well
known monotonicity requirements from the literature on cooperative games with
transferable utility.
The paper is organized as follows. In Section 2 we develop the constituting elements
of our theory. In the third section we introduce our analysis of the explicit exercise
of authority through the concept of a normal form authority game. Section 4 is
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devoted to the analysis of the latent exercise of authority. In Section 5 we give a
comparison of both models. Section 6 discusses some concluding remarks as well
as the relationship of this approach to the existing literature on authority or power
in hierarchical organizations. Throughout this paper the proofs of the results are
relegated to the appendix.
2 Foundations of the theory
In this section we introduce the three primitives of our theory, discussed in the in-
troduction. These three primitive elements are collected into a so-called authority
situation, which gives a complete description of the agents’ output values, the formal
authority relationships between the participating agents, as well as their preferences.
Our formal theory is founded on the theory of cooperative games with an author-
ity structure developed in Gilles, Owen, and van den Brink [16], Derks and Gilles
[12], Gilles and Owen [15], van den Brink [7], and van den Brink and Gilles [8].
In this theory a standard cooperative game with transferable utility is extended to
incorporate hierarchical authority relationships between the players. Here we limit
ourselves to the formal theory of the so-called conjunctive approach introduced by
Gilles, Owen and van den Brink [16].
Throughout the paper we let N = {1, . . . , n} be a given finite set of agents, who
engage in productive activities and are collectively endowed with some given, for-
mal hierarchical authority structure. For a description of the productive capabilities
of teams of agents in the given set N seeking access to the firm’s asset, we base
ourselves on the theory of Alchian and Demsetz [2] on team production. As usual,
we employ the concept of a cooperative game with transferable utility on N to de-
scribe the potential output values that the various teams can generate by accessing
the firm’s productive asset. The hypothesis that these potential output values can be
represented through a cooperative game is also one of the principles underlying Hart
and Moore [23] and Ichiishi [26].
Formally, a cooperative game with transferable utility — or simply a game — on N
is a function v : 2N → R such that v (∅) = 0. A game assigns to every team of agents
E ⊂ N some potential output value v (E) ∈ R that can be attained collectively by that
team through accessing the firm’s productive asset. The collection of all games on
agent set N is denoted by GN.
A game v ∈ GN is monotone if for all E ⊂ F ⊂ N we have v (E) 6 v (F). Note that
this implies that v (E) > 0 for all E ⊂ N. A game v ∈ GN is strictly monotone if v is
monotone and for all E ⊂ F ⊂ N with E 6= F we have v (E) < v (F).
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2.1 Authority structures
Next we consider the description of formal authority relationships between the par-
ticipants in the production organization. An authority structure on N is a map S : N →
2N that assigns to every agent i ∈ N a set S(i) ⊂ N of direct subordinates4. The class
of all authority structures on N is denoted by SN.
Here we interpret an authority structure S ∈ SN as that an agent j ∈ S (i) has
to obtain “permission” from agent i for any productive activity that he intends to
undertake by himself or with other agents in a team, through accessing the firm’s
productive asset. In this respect, the set S−1(i) = {j ∈ N | i ∈ S(j)} consists of all
direct superiors of i.
There are several interpretations of what the concept of “permission” might entail.
We limit ourselves to the conjunctive approach, developed in Gilles, Owen and van
den Brink [16], van den Brink and Gilles [8], and Derks and Gilles [12], in which
the induced authority structure establishes complete control of the superior over her
direct subordinates5.
First we introduce some auxiliary concepts. Let S ∈ SN and E ⊂ N. We define S (E) =
∪i∈ES (i) as the set of direct subordinates of the agents in the team E. Similarly, we
define S−1 (E) = ∪i∈ES
−1 (i) as the set of direct superiors of the agents in E.
The transitive closure of S ∈ SN is the mapping Ŝ : N → 2N which for every agent
i ∈ N is defined by j ∈ Ŝ (i) if and only if there is a finite sequence h1, . . . , hk ∈ N
with h1 = i, hk = j, and ht+1 ∈ S (ht) for all 1 6 t 6 k − 1. The agents in Ŝ (i) are
called the (direct and indirect) subordinates of i in authority structure S. Similarly,
the agents in Ŝ−1(i) := {j ∈ N | i ∈ Ŝ(j)} are called the (direct and indirect) superiors
of i in S.
Finally, we define BS = {i ∈ N | S
−1(i) = ∅} and WS = {i ∈ N | S(i) = ∅}.
BS is the set of position in S that are undominated. They can be interpreted as the
“executive officers” within the authority structure S. Similarly, the set WS consists of
all powerless positions in the authority structure S. These positions can be interpreted
as “non-management positions”, and the agents occupying these positions can simply
be indicated as “workers”.
Two basic properties of authority structures are used throughout this paper:
Definition 2.1 An authority structure S ∈ SN is called
(i) acyclic if i /∈ Ŝ (i) for every agent i ∈ N, and
(ii) transparent if S (i) ∩ Ŝ (S (i)) = ∅ for every i ∈ N.
4We remark that the set of ordered pairs {(i, j) | i ∈ N, j ∈ S(i)} describes a directed graph.
5Alternatively, in the disjunctive approach, developed in Gilles and Owen [15] and van den Brink
[7], the imposed authority structure consists of partial control in the sense that only the collective of all
direct superiors can veto an action of a direct subordinate.
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Acyclicity requires that there are no formal authority cycles, which is a rather mild
requirement. Essentially it implies that the organization structure is “top-down”. The
transparency condition implies that within the authority structure an agent is never a
direct superior of one of the subordinates of her subordinates, i.e., indirect authority
relationships never coincide with direct authority relationships. This condition there-
fore imposes that the organization is “lean” and is not burdened with unnecessary
authority relationships.
We emphasize that neither acyclicity nor transparency imply that the authority
structure is hierarchical in the sense that there is a unique position at the top of the
structure, i.e., the property that |BS| = 1. Hence, throughout this paper we work with
very general authority structures, possibly with multiple “executive officers”.6
2.2 Utility structures
Since we consider these games to be descriptions of potential output values rather
than realized output values, it is natural to suppose that the agents have preferences
over which production situation they participate in. We assume that these preferences
are completely based on the (potential) output values that the various teams can
attain, and do not depend on the authority relationships between the agents.
Formally, each agent i ∈ N is assumed to be endowed with a von Neumann-
Morgenstern utility function ui : G
N → R over all possible games. Now the composite
function u : GN → RN defines a utility structure over GN. A utility structure describes
the preferences of the agents in N. In the literature certain utility structures have a
prominent place. (We refer to the seminal work of Herstein and Milnor [25].) Roth
[39, 41] has shown that the adoption of certain risk-neutrality assumptions leads to
the Shapley value (Shapley [42]) as the only feasible vNM utility structure7. The





(|E| − 1) ! (n − |E|) !
n!
(v (E) − v (E \ {i})) (1)
The following properties of utility structures are important in our analysis.
Definition 2.2 The utility structure u : GN → RN on GN satisfies
(i) dual monotonicity if for every v, w ∈ GN such that there is an F ⊂ N for which
v(F) 6 w(F), and v(E) = w(E) for all E ∈ 2N \ {F}, it holds that ui(v) > ui(w)
for all i ∈ N \ F.
6Usually, one might have even in mind an authority structure that is strictly hierarchical in the sense
that it is acyclic as well as hierarchical. We use such structures to illustrate properties in some of our
examples.
7In the related literature on incomplete contracts the Shapley value has also been used in e.g., Hart
and Moore [23]. Implementations of the Shapley value are given by, e.g., Gul [20], Hart and Mas-Colell
[22] and Pérez-Castillo and Wettstein [34].
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(ii) strong dual monotonicity if for every v, w ∈ GN such that there is an F ⊂ N
for which v(F) < w(F), and v(E) = w(E) for all E ∈ 2N \ {F}, it holds that
ui(v) > ui(w) for all i ∈ N \ F.
Dual monotonicity (respectively strong dual monotonicity) state that the utility of an
agent does not decrease (respectively increases) if the production value of a coali-
tion that does not contain this player does not increase (decreases), while all other
production values remain unchanged. So, these properties impose that agents are
envious of potential payoffs to teams of which they are not a member. In this regard
these properties formalize a relative notion of monotonicity in the sense that players
get higher utility from obtaining higher team production values relative to the level
of production values generated by other teams.
By repeated application of the definition of strong dual monotonicity as given in
Definition 2.2 (i), we can restate strong dual monotonicity in the following form that
we use throughout this paper.
Lemma 2.3 A utility structure u : GN → RN satisfies strong dual monotonicity if and
only if for all v, w ∈ GN and i ∈ N such that
(i) there is a team F ⊂ N \ {i} for which v(F) < w(F),
(ii) v(E) 6 w(E) for all E ⊂ N \ {i}, and
(iii) v(E) = w(E) for all E ⊂ N with i ∈ E,
it holds that ui(v) > ui(w).
Next we compare the dual monotonicity properties introduced here with two well-
accepted monotonicity conditions from the literature on cooperative game theory.
Dual monotonicity in some sense can be perceived as a dual formulation of Shubik’s
[43] notion of coalitional monotonicity. A utility structure u : GN → RN satisfies
coalitional monotonicity if for every v, w ∈ GN such that there is an F ⊂ N for which
v(F) > w(F), and v(E) = w(E) for all E ∈ 2N \ {F}, it holds that ui(v) > ui(w) for
all i ∈ F. The following example shows that in general these two properties do not
imply one another.




i∈N gi(v) > 0.
Let the utility structure u : GN → R distribute the worth v(N) proportional to the
values gi(v) over the agents if G(v) > 0, and according to the egalitarian rule if





v (N) if G(v) > 0
v(N)
n
if G(v) = 0.
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This utility structure satisfies dual monotonicity but does not satisfy coalitional monotonic-
ity. Consider the games v, w ∈ GN with N = {1, 2, 3} given by
v(E) =
{




1 if E = {1}
0 otherwise.





Similarly, by taking gi(v) = max{minE, i∈E v(E), 0} it can be shown that coalitional
monotonicity does not imply dual monotonicity. ¤
However, dual and coalitional monotonicity are equivalent under the assumption that
the utility structure satisfies additivity and the null player property8.
Proposition 2.5 Let the utility structure u : GN → RN satisfy additivity and the null
player property. Then u satisfies dual monotonicity if and only if it satisfies coalitional
monotonicity.
The proof of this proposition is relegated to the appendix of this paper. As stated
in Definition 2.2 a utility structure u : GN → RN satisfies strong dual monotonicity
if it satisfies the dual monotonicity condition stated with the inequalities replaced
by strict inequalities. Similarly we can replace the inequalities in the definition of
coalitional monotonicity by strict inequalities. Proposition 2.5 also holds if we replace
the monotonicity concept by these strict monotonicity concepts.
Second, we compare dual monotonicity with the notion of Young’s [48] strong
monotonicity. A utility structure u : GN → RN satisfies Young’s strong monotonicity
property if for every v, w ∈ GN and i ∈ N it holds that ui(v) > ui(w) whenever
v(E ∪ {i}) − v(E) > w(E ∪ {i}) − w(E) for all E ⊂ N \ {i}.
Proposition 2.6 If u : GN → RN satisfies Young’s strong monotonicity property, then it
satisfies dual monotonicity.
For a proof of Proposition 2.6 we refer to the appendix. Dual monotonicity does not
imply Young’s strong monotonicity. The egalitarian utility structure ū which is based
on the equal division of the total output value of the grand coalition N, and is given
by ūi (v) =
v(N)
n
, for example, satisfies dual monotonicity but does not satisfy Young’s
strong monotonicity (which can be seen from the games v, w ∈ GN with N = {1, 2}
given by v(E) = 1 if |E| = 1, v(N) = 2, w({1}) = w({1, 2}) = 1 and w({2}) = 0.)
Finally, we remark that, for example, all utility structures u : GN → RN for which
there are constants pk > 0, 0 6 k 6 n, such that for every v it holds that ui(v) =
8Utility structure u satisfies additivity if u(v + w) = u(v) + u(w) for every pair of games v, w, where
game (v + w) is defined as (v + w)(E) = v(E) + w(E) for all E ⊂ N. Utility structure u satisfies the null
player property if for every v and i ∈ N with v(E ∪ {i}) = v(E) for all E ⊂ N, it holds that ui(v) = 0.
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∑
E⊂N p|E|(v(E∪ {i})− v(E)), satisfy strong dual monotonicity as well as strong coali-
tional monotonicity. Familiar examples of such solution concepts are the Shapley
value, for which pk =
(k−1)!(n−k)!
n!




all 1 6 k 6 n. (For an elaborate discussion of this class of utility structures we refer
to Weber [45].)9
2.3 Authority situations
Next we combine the three primitive elements introduced previously. The com-
bination of these elements is denoted as an authority situation. Formally, a pair
(v, S) ∈ GN × SN is called a game with an authority structure on N. A triple (v, S, u)
with u : GN → RN a utility structure and (v, S) a game with an authority structure, is
called an authority situation on N. Next, we define an inessential agent as an agent
who is a null player in the game as well as an irrelevant member of the authority
structure in the sense that he has no authority over any other agents.
Definition 2.7 An agent i ∈ N is inessential in authority situation (v, S, u) if i ∈ WS
and v (E ∪ {i}) = v (E) for every E ⊂ N.
Next we address how an authority situation can be evaluated. As mentioned we
assume throughout that each superior is in principle able to exercise full authority
over her subordinates within (v, S). If such full authority is exercised, a team E ⊂ N
cannot form without the appropriate authority from its superiors in Ŝ−1 (E). Formally,
a team E ⊂ N is autonomous in S if Ŝ−1 (E) ⊂ E. We denote by ΦS the collection of
all autonomous teams in the authority structure S.
If the team E is not autonomous, it cannot freely access the firm’s productive asset
and attain its potential productive output value. However, we can identify the largest
sub-team that can freely access the firm’s asset. Formally, E’s autonomous part in S is
given by σS (E) = E \ Ŝ (N \ E). So, E is autonomous if and only if σS (E) = E.
Definition 2.8 Let (v, S) ∈ GN × SN be a game with an authority structure on N. Its
restriction R (v, S) ∈ GN is defined by R (v, S) (E) = v (σS (E)) for every E ⊂ N.
The induced mapping R(·, S) : GN → GN is linear and incorporates the effects of
exercising authority over the positions of the agents in the authority relationships
S.10 We illustrate the introduced concepts with an example.
9In case of simple games, Roth [40] shows that the utility structure defined by this type of conditions
includes the Banzhaf value (Banzhaf [5]). We refer to van den Brink and van der Laan [9] for a complete
discussion of the properties of the normalized Banzhaf value.
10Properties of this mapping are investigated in Gilles, Owen and van den Brink [16]. We remark that
similar approaches have been developed to analyze other restrictions on team formation. In particular
we refer to the seminal contribution by Aumann and Drèze [3] for situations with coalitional partitions











Figure 1: The permission structures of Example 2.9.
Example 2.9 We discuss a situation with four agents, N = {1, 2, 3, 4}, and consider
two games with an authority structure (v, S1) and (v, S2). The authority structures S1
and S2 are given by S1(1) = {2, 3, 4}, S1(2) = S1(4) = ∅, S1(3) = {4}, and S2(1) =
{3}, S2(2) = S2(4) = ∅, S2(3) = {4}. These authority structures are depicted in Figure
1. We let the game v be given by v (E) = 3 if 4 ∈ E and v (E) = 0 otherwise.
We remark that authority structure S1 is not transparent since S1 (1) ∩ Ŝ1 (S1 (1)) =
{4} 6= ∅. Hence, agent 1 dominates agent 4 directly, although 1 also dominates
4 indirectly through 3. On the other hand, authority structure S2 is transparent.
Furthermore,
R (v, S1) (E) = R (v, S2) (E) =
{
3 if {1, 3, 4} ⊂ E
0 otherwise.
Hence, the restriction of v on both authority structures is the same. This is due to the
fact that there are superfluous relationships in non-transparent hierarchies. Deleting
these relationships does not affect the restriction of a game. This is the case for the
relationship between agents 1 and 4 in S1.
Furthermore, agent 2 is an inessential agent in (v, S1). Removing relationships with
inessential agents does not affect the restriction either. (We also refer to van den
Brink and Gilles [8] for more elaborate discussions.) ¤
Next we address the question whether the restriction R is an appropriate descrip-
tion of the explicit enforcement of authority. The next theorem gives a norma-
tive justification for its use. We identify the restriction R as the unique mapping
F : GN×SN → GN satisfying four regularity assumptions and one descriptive hypoth-
esis. This descriptive hypothesis, stated as 2.10(v), requires that an agent i ∈ N \WS
“vetoes” her direct subordinates j ∈ S (i) in the sense that the contribution of agent j
to a team is non-trivial only if agent i herself is a member of that team. This exactly
describes that a superior can deny a subordinate access to the firm’s productive asset.
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Theorem 2.10 A mapping F : GN× SN → GN is equal to the restriction R if and only
if the mapping F satisfies the following properties:
(i) For every (v, S) ∈ GN × SN it holds that F(v, S)(N) = v(N);
(ii) For every (v, S), (w, S) ∈ GN × SN it holds that F(v + w, S) = F(v, S) +
F(w, S);
(iii) For every (v, S) ∈ GN×SN and i ∈ N such that all j ∈ Ŝ(i)∪ {i} are null players
in v it holds that i is a null player in F(v, S);
(iv) For every (v, S) ∈ GN × SN and i ∈ N such that v(E) = 0 for all E ⊂ N \ {i} it
holds that F(v, S)(E) = 0 for all E ⊂ N \ {i};
(v) For every (v, S) ∈ GN × SN, i ∈ N, j ∈ S(i), and E ⊂ N \ {i} it holds
that F(v, S)(E) = F(v, S)(E \ {j}).
The proof of this theorem is as usual relegated to the appendix. Without proof we
mention that the five properties in Theorem 2.10 are independent, and thus this
axiomatization is proper.
The remainder of this paper discusses two game theoretic approaches to the exercise
of authority in hierarchical organizations using the restriction R. In these approaches
the individual agents decide whether to exercise authority over their subordinates
based on their preferences as represented by the utility structure u.
Throughout this paper we consider a given authority situation (v, S, u) in which
there are no inessential agents. We make this assumption solely for notational conve-
nience. Without exception, our results can be restated to include inessential agents.
We consider which of the formal authority relationships in S agent i ∈ N\WS chooses
to enforce. Thus, each agent i ∈ N\WS selects a subset T (i) ⊂ S (i) of formal author-
ity relationships that she decides to enforce. If each potential superior has selected
such a set of explicitly enforced authority relationships we arrive at an authority
structure consisting of exactly all explicitly enforced authority relationships. The re-
sulting authority structure is an element in the collection of authority structures
H (S) :=
{
T ∈ SN | T (i) ⊂ S (i) for every agent i ∈ N
}
. (2)
An authority structure T ∈ H (S) thus describes those authority relationships that are
enforced. In comparison, the relationships described by S−T ∈ H (S), where for every
i ∈ N we define (S − T) (i) = S (i) \ T (i), only have a latent or non-enforced quality.
Our next result states that under certain regularity conditions, agents indeed pre-
fer to exercise as much authority as possible if it is costless to do so.
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Theorem 2.11 Assume that v is a monotone game. Let h ∈ N \ WS and T ∈ H (S) be
such that T(h) 6= S(h). Finally, let Z ∈ H (S) be given by
Z(i) =
{
S(h) if i = h
T(i) otherwise.
Then:
(a) If utility structure u satisfies dual monotonicity, then uh (R (v, Z)) > uh (R (v, T)).
(b) If utility structure u satisfies strong dual monotonicity and R (v, Z) 6= R (v, T),
then uh (R (v, Z)) > uh (R (v, T)).
(c) Suppose that v is strictly monotone, S is acyclic, and u satisfies strong dual
monotonicity. If T(h) = ∅ or S is transparent, then uh (R (v, Z)) > uh (R (v, T)).
Theorem 2.11 (which proof is relegated to the appendix) forms the foundation for
further analysis of the enforcement of authority within a hierarchical organization.
3 Exercising explicit authority
In this section we analyze the decision-making processes of myopically rational agents
who decide which of their formal authority relationships to enforce explicitly. We
model this by means of a non-cooperative normal form game.
Every agent i ∈ N\WS has strategy set given by Γi = {E ⊂ N | E ⊂ S (i) }. (Clearly,
for every worker j ∈ WS it holds that Γj := {∅}.) A strategy Ei ∈ Γi describes
those subordinates over which agent i explicitly enforces her authority. Let E =
(E1, . . . , En) ∈ Γ :=
∏
i∈N Γi be a strategy tuple. Then the resulting authority struc-
ture is the one given by TE ∈ H (S) with TE (i) := Ei for all i ∈ N.
Since the explicit exercise of authority usually induces a cost to monitor these
subordinates, we introduce a fixed monitoring cost parameter c > 0. We impose that
monitoring any subordinate j ∈ S(i) by an agent i ∈ N \ WS will cost c > 0. This
leads to the following formalization:
Definition 3.1 The authority game induced by authority situation (v, S, u) and mon-







strategy tuple E = (E1, . . . , En) ∈ Γ :
uci (E) = ui (R (v, TE)) − c |Ei| . (3)
For the authority game Θc with monitoring cost c > 0 we consider the standard Nash
and strict Nash equilibrium concepts. A strategy tuple Ê =
(
Ê1, . . . , Ên
)
∈ Γ is a
















∈ Γ is a modification of the strategy tuple Ê in which
agent i selects Ei and each agent j 6= i selects Êj. We denote by N (Θ
c) ⊂ Γ the set of
all Nash equilibria of the authority game Θc.
A Nash equilibrium Ê ∈ N (Θc) is called strict if for every i ∈ N and every Ei ∈ Γi










. The set of strict Nash equilibria of
Θc is denoted by Ns (Θ
c) ⊂ N (Θc).
For ease of notation we denote for every authority structure T ∈ H (S) the cor-
responding strategy tuple by ET =
(




, where ETi := T (i) for every i ∈ N.
The strategy tuple ES refers to the complete exercise of authority within the given
structure S.
Definition 3.2 An authority structure T ∈ H (S) is (v, S)-equivalent if R (v, T) =
R (v, S). We denote by M (v, S) the collection of (v, S)-equivalent authority structures.
An authority structure T ∈ H (S) is (v, S)-minimal if T is (v, S)-equivalent and
|T | = min
{∣∣T ′
∣∣ ∣∣ T ′ ∈ M (v, S)
}
(4)
where |T ′| =
∑
i∈N |T
′ (i)| is the total number of authority relationships in the authority
structure T ′ ∈ H (S). We denote by M̂ (v, S) the set of (v, S)-minimal authority struc-
tures.
We remark that S ∈ M (v, S) and therefore M̂ (v, S) 6= ∅ for any game with an author-
ity structure. Using these auxiliary concepts we are able to show that Nash equilibria
under costless monitoring exist for dual monotone utility structures, while for strong
dual monotonicity even complete characterizations can be given. The proofs of the
following theorems are relegated to the appendix.
Theorem 3.3 Let (v, S, u) be an authority situation such that u is a dual monotone
utility structure and v is a monotone game. Then:
(a)
{
ET | T ∈ M (v, S)
}










So, for the authority situations described in this theorem, all strategy tuples that cor-
respond to enforced authority yielding the fully restricted game R (v, S) are Nash
equilibria if monitoring costs are zero. Moreover, if there exists a strict Nash equilib-
rium then it is unique and equal to the full enforcement strategy tuple in which all
agents decide to enforce authority over all there direct subordinates.
Next we address the Nash equilibria under costless monitoring and strong dual
monotonicity.
Theorem 3.4 Let authority situation (v, S, u) be such that u is a strongly dual monotone
utility structure and v is a monotone game.
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So, for the authority situations described in this theorem with monitoring costs equal
to zero, if not enforcing all authority relationships in S yields a restricted game that
is not equal to R (v, S) then the full enforcement strategy tuple is the unique Nash
and strict Nash equilibrium. Otherwise, if the restricted game R (v, S) can be realized
with less enforced relationships then there is no strict Nash equilibrium while the set
of Nash equilibria is equal to the set of strategy tuples that correspond to enforced
authority yielding the fully restricted game.
We remark that the assertions of Theorem 3.4 are no longer valid if the utility
structure is merely dual monotone instead of strongly dual monotone. The egalitar-
ian utility structure ū given by ūi (v) =
v(N)
|N|
, for example, is dual monotone, but
not strongly dual monotone. For any (v, T), T ∈ H (S), ū (R (v, T)) = ū (v), i.e., the







ET | T ∈ H (S)
}
.
For sufficiently low monitoring costs we derive the following insight.
Theorem 3.5 Let authority situation (v, S, u) be such that u is a strongly dual monotone
utility structure and v is a monotone game. Then there exists a cost level c∗ > 0 such




∣∣∣ T ∈ M̂ (v, S)
}
.
So, for the authority situations described in this theorem for sufficiently low mon-
itoring costs, the set of Nash equilibria is equal to the set of strategy tuples that
correspond to enforced authority yielding (v, S)-minimal authority structures.
It is evident that every minimal authority structure is transparent, i.e., there are
no superfluous authority relationships in such structures. This immediately leads to
the following corollary of Theorem 3.5.
Corollary 3.6 If the utility structure is strongly dual monotone, the game is monotone,
and the monitoring costs are sufficiently low, then the resulting Nash equilibrium au-
thority structures are transparent.
Example 3.7 Consider the games with authority structure of Example 2.9. For any
authority situation (v, S1, u) with the utility structure u strongly dual monotone, the
unique resulting Nash equilibrium authority structure for sufficiently low monitoring
costs is S2. (In fact, S2 is the unique (v, S1)-minimal authority structure.) Clearly
in S2 neither the redundant authority relationship (1, 4) nor the ineffective authority
relationship (1, 2) are enforced. ¤
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4 Exercising latent authority
In the previous section we discussed the explicit exercise of authority. Next we con-
sider a more advanced form of reasoning on part of the agents in the authority situ-
ation. Under this type of advanced rationality there might result situations in which
superiors abstain from the explicit exercise of authority, but in which their authority
remains effective. Here, even though authority is not exercised explicitly, subor-
dinates might nevertheless perceive a potential, or latent, threat that a superior is
willing to exercise that authority explicitly and incur monitoring costs if they do not
voluntarily restrict their productive activities. Thus, these subordinates might act as
if authority was exercised explicitly. If such behavior results, we talk about latent
authority to distinguish it from explicit authority.
It is clear that such latent authority cannot be described properly by the game
theoretic structure introduced in the previous section. In those authority games the
only way for an agent to profit from her formal authority is to explicitly enforce
it. In this section we present an approach in which agents can choose to enforce
authority explicitly as well as not to enforce any authority at all. This allows us
to define an equilibrium concept that incorporates that the subordinates perceive
threats that their superiors will enforce authority relationships with them. Thus, the
resulting equilibria describe outcomes that are based on implicit rather than explicit
considerations. This approach is based on the theory of social situations developed
in Greenberg [17].
For every authority structure T ∈ H (S) we define the set of potential authorizers
in T by
ψ (T) = {i ∈ N \ WS | T (i) = ∅ } .
Here, the agents in ψ (T) ⊂ N \ WS = {i ∈ N |S (i) 6= ∅ } are the ones who are unde-
cided regarding the explicit enforcement of their authority. From this it might be clear
that the set of explicit authorizers in T can be introduced as ψ′ (T) = N\(ψ (T) ∪ WS).
Note that for T0 ∈ H (S) given by T0 (i) = ∅ for every i ∈ N, it holds that ψ (T0) =
N \ WS and ψ
′ (T0) = ∅.
To describe the ability of a superior i ∈ N \WS to enforce authority, we introduce
an auxiliary tool. Namely, as long as agent i does not enforce any authority, she still
has the ability to execute her authority over any subset of her direct subordinates.
Hence, agent i can induce from any authority structure in which she does not enforce
any authority, another authority structure in which she (partially) enforces the formal
authority that is assigned to her within S.
The point-to-set mapping γi : H (S) → 2
H(S) is the veto correspondence for agent
i ∈ N on S ∈ SN if
γi (T) =
{ {
TFi | ∅ 6= F ⊂ S (i)
}
if i ∈ ψ (T)
∅ if i ∈ N \ ψ (T)
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where for every F ⊂ S (i) we define TFi ∈ H (S) by
TFi (j) =
{
F if j = i
T (j) if j 6= i.
The multidimensional mapping γ := (γ1, . . . , γn) : H (S) → 2
H(S)×N is called the veto
structure on S.
Let γ = (γ1, . . . , γn) be the veto structure on S. It is obvious that γ defines a
configuration that describes the exact enforcement of authority within the boundaries
of a given authority structure. Remark that each agent in N \ WS can announce only
once over which direct subordinates she is exercising explicit authority. Within the
veto structure γ we are now able to construct equilibria that describe the stable states
of the latent exercise of authority. We define for every T ∈ H (S)
Λ (v, T) = {R (v, Z) | T(i) ⊂ Z(i) ⊂ S(i) for all i ∈ N }
as the set of all games that can potentially result from T within (v, S). So, all explicitly
enforced relations in T must be respected, but the non-explicitly enforced relations
in S − T may or may not be exercised.
Definition 4.1 Let (v, S, u) be some authority situation on N.
(i) A point-to-set mapping Σ : H (S) → 2G
N
is an authority protocol for (v, S, u)
if for every T ∈ H (S) it holds that Σ(T) ⊂ Λ (v, T).
(ii) Let monitoring cost c > 0 be given. An authority protocol Σc : H (S) → 2G
N
is
stable for (v, S, u) if for every T ∈ H (S) it holds that w ∈ Σc(T) if and only if
w ∈ Λ (v, T) and there is no agent i ∈ ψ(T), authority structure T ′ ∈ γi(T) and
w′ ∈ Σc(T ′) with
ui(w
′) − c|T ′(i)| > ui(w) − c|T(i)|. (5)
An authority protocol assigns to every authority structure T within S a set of games
that can emerge within (v, T, u) given the formal authority structure S. In this respect
an authority protocol is a potential solution for the latent exercise of authority within
(v, S, u).
A stable authority protocol is an equilibrium concept that describes the latent exer-
cise of authority within an authority situation. Namely, it incorporates the individual
incentives to explicitly veto subordinates. However, it formalizes the potential, or
latent, development of the exercise of authority, not how it is actualized. Hence, it
exactly formalizes the notion of a perceived exercise of authority within an authority
situation. We remark that a stable authority protocol satisfies the von Neumann-
Morgenstern notions of internal and external stability. For convenience we indicate a
stable authority protocol by SAP.
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The next theorem addresses the existence of a stable authority protocol and a
characterization for low monitoring costs.
Theorem 4.2 Let (v, S, u) be an authority situation such that v ∈ GN is monotone and
S ∈ SN is acyclic. Then:
(a) For every monitoring cost c > 0 there exists a unique stable authority protocol
Σc∗ for (v, S, u).
(b) If the utility structure u is strongly dual monotone, then there exists a monitoring
cost level c∗ > 0 such that for every 0 6 c < c∗ and every T ∈ H (S) it holds that
Σc∗(T) = {R (v, Z)} where Z ∈ S
N is given by
Z (i) =
{
S (i) if i ∈ ψ (T)
T (i) if i /∈ ψ (T) .
In particular, Σc∗ (T0) = {R (v, S)} for 0 6 c < c
∗, where T0 (i) = ∅ for every
i ∈ N.
For a proof we again refer to the appendix. So, the first part of this theorem says
that there is a unique SAP for authority situations with a monotone game and an
acyclic authority structure. Moreover, according to the second part, if the utility
structure u is strongly dual monotone then for low enough monitoring cost, all direct
subordinates of agents that have not yet explicitly exercised their authority act as
if they were monitored by their superiors. In particular, if no agent has explicitly
enforced her authority to monitor and veto, every subordinate acts as if all agents
fully enforce their authority. Hence, in equilibrium full latent authority is enforced11.
5 The case of high monitoring costs
In this section we consider the consequences of higher monitoring costs for the ex-
plicit and latent exercise of authority. We use a simple example to clarify some of
these consequences. A general analytical study is rather involved and therefore sub-
ject of future research.
Throughout this section we consider a three agent situation with N = {1, 2, 3}.
Furthermore, we impose the authority situation (v, S, ϕS), where the utility structure
ϕS : GN → RN is equal to the Shapley value (see Equation (1), the formal authority
structure S is given by S(1) = S(2) = {3} and S(3) = ∅ (see Figure 2), and the output
values are given by the game v (E) = 1 if 3 ∈ E, and v (E) = 0 otherwise.
11We remark that this equilibrium concept is very different from a Nash equilibrium refinement, such
as a subgame perfect Nash equilibrium, in an extensive form game where first the agents decide to which
superiors they voluntarily submit and after that the agents decide which authority over subordinates
they explicitly enforce. In such an extensive form game the order in which superiors make decisions




Figure 2: The authority structure S.
We develop the analysis of this authority situation in three steps: explicit exercise
of authority, latent exercise of authority, and a comparison between these two models
of behavior.
5.1 The explicit exercise of authority
Since agent 3 has no subordinates we treat the authority game as a two-person game.
The strategies of the two agents 1 and 2 in the authority game Θc are given by
Γ1 = Γ2 = {{3} , ∅}. For convenience we denote these two basic strategies as V = {3}
(veto) and N = ∅ (no veto).
Given positive monitoring cost c > 0 the payoffs for the four possible strategy pro-
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and u(N, N) = (0, 0, 1). The Nash equilibria for different values of c are now repre-
sented in the following table:
Cost level Equilibria Utilities
c < 1
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< c < 1
2

























N (Θc) = {(N, N)} u = (0, 0, 1)
So, if c < 1
3
or c > 1
2
there is a unique Nash equilibrium (both veto, respectively, not
veto), and for intermediate values there are multiple Nash equilibria.
5.2 The latent exercise of authority
Next we consider the latent exercise of authority and the corresponding notion of a
stable authority protocol. For convenience we denote by T1, T2, and T0 the authority
structures given by T1(1) = {3}, T1(2) = T1(3) = ∅ (only agent 1 enforces explicit
authority over agent 3), T2(1) = T2(3) = ∅, T2(2) = {3} (only agent 2 enforces
explicit authority over agent 3), and T0(1) = T0(2) = T0(3) = ∅ (neither 1 nor 2
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enforce explicit authority over agent 3). For S, T1, T2, and T0 we have
Λ (v, S) = {R (v, S)}
Λ (v, T1) = {R (v, T1) ,R (v, S)}
Λ (v, T2) = {R (v, T2) ,R (v, S)}
Λ (v, T0) = {R (v, T0) ,R (v, T1) , R (v, T2) ,R (v, S)}
For any cost c > 0 the unique SAP assigns to the full authority structure S its restric-
tion R (v, S) because nothing else can be induced from that situation. For the other
situations we distinguish three possibilities:
• c < 1
3
: Suppose that in situation T1 the game R (v, T1) with payoffs (
1
2
− c, 0, 1
2
)







SAP Σc∗ cannot assign R (v, T1) to this situation (agent 2’s payoff if he induces S
is 1
3
− c which exceeds its payoff 0 in situation T1). So, Σ
c
∗(T1) = {R (v, S)} with






). (Note that agent 2 does not actually has to pay
its monitoring cost if R (v, S) is played in situation T1). By a similar argument








Now, suppose that in situation T0 the game R (v, T0) with payoffs (0, 0, 1) is
played. Since agent 1 can induce T1 and the SAP assigns R (v, S) to situation







)), the SAP cannot assign the game R (v, T0) to
situation T0 (agent 1’s payoff if he induces T1 is
1
3
− c which exceeds its payoff





) is played. Since agent 2 can induce T2 and the SAP assigns R (v, S)







)), the SAP cannot assign the game R (v, T1) to
situation T0. Similarly, R (v, T2) /∈ Σ
c
∗(T0). So, also in this situation Σ
c
∗(T0) =
{R (v, S)}. Thus according to the SAP, in situation T0 agents act as if both agents










< c < 1
2
: Suppose that in situation T1 the game R (v, T1) with payoffs
(1
2
− c, 0, 1
2
) is played. Since agent 1 cannot induce any other situation and














) is played, agent 2 cannot induce a situation in which it can
do better. So, Σc∗(T1) = {R (v, T1) ,R (v, S)}. (Note the difference with c <
1
3
considered above in which only R (v, S) was stable.) By a similar argument
Σc∗(T2) = {R (v, T2) ,R (v, S)}.
Now, suppose that in situation T0 the game R (v, T0) with payoffs (0, 0, 1) is
played. Since agent 1 can induce T1 to which the SAP assigns R (v, T1) (with
payoffs (1
2
− c, 0, 1
2
)), the SAP cannot assign the game R (v, T0) to situation
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T0. Suppose that in situation T0 the game R (v, T1) with payoffs (
1
2
− c, 0, 1
2
) is





)), the SAP cannot assign the game R (v, T1) to situation T0.
Similarly, R (v, T2) /∈ Σ
c
∗(T0). No agent can induce an advantageous situation if






) is played. So, in this situation Σc∗(T0) = {R (v, S)}.
Note that, although in the intermediate situations T1 and T2 the latent exercise




< c < 1
2
, for both cases
in situation T0 agents act as if both agents 1 and 2 enforce full authority over







• c > 1
2
: In a similar way as above, it can be shown that Σc∗(S) = {R (v, S)},
Σc∗(T1) = {R (v, T1) ,R (v, S)} and Σ
c
∗(T2) = {R (v, T2) ,R (v, S)}. Finally, it can
be determined that everything is stable in the situation in which all authority is
latent, Σc∗(T0) = {R (v, T0) ,R(v, T1),R (v, T2) ,R (v, S)}.
• For c = 1
3




Comparing the Nash equilibria of the authority game (describing the explicit exer-
cise of authority) and the stable authority protocol (describing the latent exercise of
authority) allows us to conclude that there is a difference of the equilibrium utility
levels when c < 1
2
. Namely, under explicit exercise of authority the monitoring costs
are actually realized, while this is not the case under the latent exercise of authority.
For 1
3
< c < 1
2
even the attitude towards exercising authority is different, as de-
scribed by these equilibrium concepts. Namely, in the Nash equilibrium of the author-
ity game authority is not enforced fully, while under the SAP the agents act as if this
authority is enforced fully if no agent has announced whether it is going to enforce its
authority. This significant difference indicates that if agents are myopic—as modelled
in the authority game—, there would be no full exercise of authority in equilibrium.
However, a more advanced form of rationality on part of the subordinates—as mod-
elled by the concept of a stable authority protocol—, would induce them to accept
full (latent) authority.
6 Concluding remarks
In this paper we have developed a theory of the nature of authority within a given
production organization, described as a hierarchical authority structure with team
production. We introduced two models of the exercise of authority in a framework
including a description of team production, an arbitrarily complex authority struc-
ture of decision makers who are principal to certain decision makers and agents to
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other decision makers, and a utility structure. The first model addresses the explicit
enforcement of authority through costly monitoring. The second model describes a
latent form of the exercise of authority, namely the rational acceptance of authority
even though this authority is not enforced explicitly.
We emphasize that at the foundation of our theory, we consider the question of
ownership of the firm’s asset to have no bearing on the study of the nature of author-
ity. Indeed, we base our modelling on the hypothesis that ownership and control are
fundamentally separated and that “control” is represented by the authority structure.
Here decision makers in the authority structure have delegated control over the firm’s
asset in the sense that a decision maker can deny the access of her subordinates to
the asset. This modelling principle corresponds to observed practices; firms are ei-
ther publicly traded or the owner exercises his or her control through managers with
delegated powers. In either case the question who exactly owns the firm’s asset is of
no consequence for the practices that result with regard to the control of the firm’s
asset. In our analysis there emerged two practices: directly or explicitly exercised
control and latently exercised control.
Finally, we emphasize that our model of the latent exercise of authority represents
the elusive concept of loyalty of subordinates to the firm and its objectives. Indeed, as
modelled, at a higher level of rationality, intelligent subordinates voluntarily submit
themselves to the objectives of their superiors to avoid being subjected to enforced
monitoring. This standard of behavior can in this respect be interpreted as a game
theoretic formulation of “loyalty”.
Relation to the literature
Our approach to the notion of authority is in line with the typology of authority
relationships considered in Aghion and Tirole [1]. They distinguish formal from real
authority within a hierarchical production organization. Formal authority can be seen
as the “right to decide” while real authority is the “effective control over decisions.”
In our theory the concept of formal authority is represented by the given structure of
formal authority relationships between agents. In our framework the notion of real
authority is then further developed into two distinct forms: explicit and latent.
Related is the distinction made in Baker, Gibbons and Murphy [4] between for-
mal (“the organizational chart”) and informal (“the way things really work”) aspects
of organizational structures. They study the interaction between asset ownership
(which they consider to be formal) and relational contracts (which they consider to
be informal). The study of differences and interaction between formal and informal
aspects of economic organizations seems to be an important and growing topic for
future research.
We emphasize that the formal authority structure of the hierarchical production
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organization in our model is exogenously given. Further research will be directed to-
wards endogenously determining the formal authority structure of the organization.
In this paper we restrict ourselves to the question what game will be played within
the organization given a particular formal authority structure. And, thus, what real
authority structures emerge endogenously within the production organization. In
this sense our model is complementary to the literature that studies the endogenous
formation of hierarchical authority structures such as principal-agent models (see,
e.g., Grossman and Hart [19] and Kessler [29]), models on vertical integration (see,
e.g., Klein, Crawford and Alchian [30]), and models on incomplete contracts (see,
e.g., Grossman and Hart [18], and Hart and Moore [23, 24]). As mentioned in the
introduction, these models assume rather simple authority structures while we allow
for arbitrarily complex formal authority structures.
To study the formation of hierarchies, our model can be extended in various ways.
One extension is introducing risk as has been pursued by Prescott and Townsend [35]
who study how risk sharing can be a reason to form collective organizations. They
study why these collective organizations form by using principal-agent relationships
between these organizations and outsiders.
Beggs [6] uses techniques from queueing theory to determine the optimal struc-
ture of hierarchies when workers differ in the range of tasks they can perform. He
studies how the complexity of tasks influences the organizational structure. He ex-
plains why many organizations have a hierarchical structure by the economies of
skilled workers. Skilled workers can make decisions without consulting other work-
ers, while unskilled workers need to ask (superior) more skilled workers for advice
or approval. In our model, the skills of different workers are not specified. Only their
contribution in the production process is characterized by the cooperative team pro-
duction game, and their position in the authority structure determines their formal
authority which can be exercised explicitly or latent. By extending our model with
differences in skills we can require that the implicit exercise of latent authority is
only possible if the subordinate worker is skillful enough to do the work on its own.
Unskilled workers always have to ask for explicit approval.
Garicano [14] develops a similar model in which he uses specialization instead
of differences in worker skills. In a “knowledge-based hierarchy” easy problems are
solved by lower (production) levels, while more exceptional or harder problems need
to be passed on to higher levels. In his model the decision “who must learn what and
whom each worker should ask when confronted with an unknown problem” is part
of the organization. We quote from Garicano [14]: “The organization is charac-
terized by the task design, as defined by the scope of discretionality of production
workers and problem solvers and structure of hierarchy, given by the span of control
of problem solvers and the number of layers in the organization”. Where our model
takes the hierarchical organization structure as given and explains which authority
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relationships are actually activated, Garicano explains the formation of hierarchies
by a trade off between communication versus knowledge acquisition costs. In our
model (like in Beggs [6]) there is no distinction between different knowledge lev-
els necessary to perform different tasks. A future direction in research is to make
this distinction in our model, and see what is the effect on the exercise of authority.
One would expect that more easy tasks are suitable to be performed under latent
authority, while more difficult tasks need more explicit authority.
Related to this work is the approach developed in Crawford and Sobel [11], which
has been extended by Dessein [13]. This approach is based on the saying Knowledge
is Power and studies the strategic transmission of information between a principal
and an agent as well as the strategic delegation of control from the principal to the
agent in a hierarchical relationship. There results a trade-off between a loss of control
through delegation and a loss of information through communication.
Like our model, the above mentioned papers set aside incentive problems since
(as Beggs [6] argues) to get more insight in the functioning of hierarchical organi-
zations it is best to focus on one of many aspects. In this sense these models are
complementary to the models which focus on incentive problems such as Qian [36]
who endogenously determines the number of hierarchical levels, the span of control
and the wage scales by using optimal control techniques, and in that way extends the
seminal work of Keren and Levhari [27, 28]. However, these papers do not address
the question what authority is actually exercised within a hierarchy.
Another aspect that we do not address here is the organizational form of a hier-
archy. Maskin, Qian and Xu [31] compare an M-form (multi-divisional form in which
the organization goes along institutional lines) with a U-form (unitary form in which
the organization goes along regional lines) with respect to their effectiveness in giv-
ing incentives to managers. In their terminology an organization is a “hierarchy of
managers built on top of technology” where the technology is present in productive
plants. It would be interesting to see if the games that are played within organiza-
tions are affected by their organizational form. For example, we might consider the
question whether latent exercise of authority appears more often in M-form organiza-
tions (which each act more independent from each other in their own region), while
in U-form organizations authority is exercised more explicitly (because the stronger
dependence between the different organizational units).
Another strand of literature that we mentioned earlier is the incomplete contracts
literature which tries to answer the question how to distribute ownership over resid-
ual rights, i.e., who has the authority over assets that are non-contractible. While
the incomplete contracts literature focusses on the ownership over residual rights to
explain the formation of firms, Rajan and Zingales [37] focus on the control of access
to critical resources. In this respect we follow in our modelling a similar principle as
Rajan and Zingales who define access as “the ability to use, or work with, a critical
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resource”. We quote: “The agent who is given privileged access to the resource gets
no new residual rights of control. All she gets is the opportunity to specialize her
human capital to the resource and make herself valuable. When combined with her
preexisting residual right to withdraw her human capital, access gives her the ability
to create a critical resource that she controls, her specialized human capital, control
over this resource is a source of power.”
Rajan and Zingales [38] develop this idea further by relating the control of ac-
cess to resources to specialization of employees (managers) and try to explain the
formation of (firm) hierarchies12. This is in line with our model in which we ex-
plain the exercise of authority over subordinate employees. Assets are comparable
with positions in our authority structure, and control over assets is exercised by ve-
toing the access to the productive asset by agents in subordinate positions. Although
their hierarchical structures are much simpler than ours, also in their model different
positions in a hierarchy have different positional power. Where Rajan and Zingales
[38] use positional power to explain the formation of firm hierarchies (by managers
splitting off from a firm and by doing so constructing a new firm), we use positional
power to explain how authority is exercised (i.e. what game is played) within a given
hierarchical production organization.
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Appendix: Proofs of the main results
Proof of Proposition 2.5
Let u : GN → RN satisfy additivity and the null player property. According to Theorem
3 in Weber [45] it then holds that for every i ∈ N there exists a collection of constants









{i}) − v(E)) for every v ∈ GN.
We now show that u satisfies dual monotonicity if and only if piE > 0 for all i ∈ N
and E ⊂ N \ {i}.
Only if
Suppose that u satisfies dual monotonicity. Let i ∈ N, F ⊂ N \ {i}, and let v ∈ GN be
such that v(F) 6 v0(F) and v(E) = v0(E) for all E ∈ 2
N \ {F}, where v0 denotes the
null game, i.e., v0(E) = 0 for all E ⊂ N.
From Weber’s result it follows that ui(v) = p
i
F(v(F ∪ {i}) − v(F)). According to dual
monotonicity and the null player property it holds that ui(v) > ui(v0) = 0. Since
v(F ∪ {i}) − v(F) > 0 it must hold that piF > 0.
If
Suppose that piE > 0 for all i ∈ N and E ⊂ N \ {i}. Let v, w ∈ G
N satisfy the condition
stated in Definition 2.2 (i), i.e. for some F ⊂ N it holds that v (F) 6 w (F) and for
all other teams E ∈ 2N \ {F} it holds that v (E) = w (E). Let i ∈ N \ F. Further, let
w′ ∈ GN be given by w′(E) = w(E) − v(E) for all E ⊂ N.
Since piF ≥ 0, w
′(F ∪ {i}) = 0, and w′(F) > 0 it holds that ui(w
′) = piF(w
′(F ∪ {i}) −
w′(F)) 6 0.
Since u satisfies additivity and w = v+w′ it holds that ui(w) = ui(v)+ui(w
′) 6 ui(v).
Thus, u satisfies dual monotonicity.
In a similar fashion it can be shown that u satisfies coalitional monotonicity if and
only if piE > 0 for all i ∈ N and E ⊂ N \ {i}. Combining these two equivalence
properties yields that u satisfies dual monotonicity if and only if it satisfies coalitional
monotonicity.
This completes the proof of Proposition 2.5.
Proof of Proposition 2.6
Suppose that u : GN → RN satisfies Young’s strong monotonicity and let v, w ∈ GN
again satisfy the condition stated in Definition 2.2 (i) , i.e., for some F ⊂ N it holds
that v (F) 6 w (F) and for all other teams E ∈ 2N \ {F} it holds that v (E) = w (E).
For every i ∈ N \ F it then holds that v(F ∪ {i}) − v(F) > w(F ∪ {i}) − w(F) and
v(E ∪ {i}) − v(E) = w(E ∪ {i}) − w(E) for all E ∈ 2N \ {F}.
From Young’s strong monotonicity of u it then follows that ui(v) > ui(w). Thus, u
satisfies dual monotonicity.
Dual monotonicity does not imply Young’s strong monotonicity property as illustrated
by the egalitarian utility structure u : GN → RN given by ui(v) =
v(N)
n
for all i ∈ N.
Obviously the utility structure u is dual monotone.
Consider the games v, w ∈ GN with N = {1, 2, 3} given by v(E) = |E| for all E ⊂ N, and
w (E) = 1 if 1 ∈ E, and w (E) = 0 otherwise. Then v(E∪{1})−v(E) = w(E∪{1})−w(E)
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for all E ⊂ N \ {1}. But u1(v) = 1 >
1
3
= u1(w). This shows that u does not satisfy
Young’s strong monotonicity.
This completes the proof of Proposition 2.6.
Proof of Theorem 2.10
First, we show that the restriction R indeed satisfies the five properties stated in the
assertion. Let S ∈ SN and v, w ∈ GN. Since σS(N) = N it holds that R(v, S)(N) =
v(σS(N)) = v(N), and thus R satisfies property (i). R satisfies (ii) since R(v +
w, S)(E) = (v + w)(σS(E)) = v(σS(E)) + w(σS(E)) = R(v, S)(E) + R(w, S)(E) for all
E ⊂ N. If i ∈ N is such that all j ∈ Ŝ(i) ∪ {i} are null players in v then R(v, S)(E) =
v(σS(E)) = v(σS(E) \ ({i}∪ Ŝ(i))) = v(σS(E \ {i})) = R(v, S)(E \ {i}) for all E ⊂ N, and
thus R satisfies property (iii). If i ∈ N is such that v(E) = 0 for all E ⊂ N\{i}, then for
E ⊂ N\ {i} we have that i /∈ σS(E) and thus R(v, S)(E) = v(σS(E)) = 0, which implies
that R satisfies property (iv). Finally, property (v) follows from the fact that j ∈ S(i)
and E ⊂ N \ {i} implies that σS(E) = σS(E \ {j}) and thus R(v, S)(E) = v(σS(E)) =
v(σS(E \ {j})) = R(v, S)(E \ {j}).
Next suppose that F : GN× SN → GNsatisfies the five properties, and let S ∈ SN.




1 if T ⊂ E
0 otherwise.
Property (i) now implies that F(wT, S)(N) = cT. Define αS(T) = T ∪ Ŝ
−1(T). We
distinguish the following cases with respect to E ⊂ N, E 6= N:
• T 6⊂ E. Since for all agents i ∈ T it holds that wT(E) = 0 for all E ⊂ N \ {i},
property (iv) implies that F(wT, S)(E) = 0.
• T ⊂ E, αS(T) 6⊂ E. Then there exists a sequence of players (h1, . . . hp) such
that h1 ∈ αS(T) \ E, hk ∈ S(hk−1) for all k ∈ {2, . . . , p}, and hp ∈ T . Property
(iv) and repeated application of property (v) then imply that F(wT, S)(E) =
F(wT, S)(E \ {j}) = 0.
• αS(T) ⊂ E. Since for all agents i ∈ N \ αS(T) it holds that all j ∈ Ŝ(i) ∪ {i} are
null players in wT, property (iii) implies that F(wT, S)(E) = F(wT, S)(N) = cT.
So, F(wT, S) = R(wT, S). The theorem then follows with property (ii) and the fact
that v can be expressed as a linear combination of the unanimity games uT in a
unique fashion.
This completes the proof of Theorem 2.10.
Proof of Theorem 2.11
We prove each of the three assertions stated in the theorem.
(a) Let F ⊂ N be such that h ∈ F. Then for every i ∈ F it holds that Z−1(i) ⊂ F
if and only if T−1(i) ⊂ F. From this it follows that σZ(F) = σT(F). Thus, for
every F ⊂ N with h ∈ F we have that
R(v, Z)(F) = v (σZ(F)) = v (σT(F)) = R(v, T)(F). (6)
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Suppose that F ⊂ N is such that h /∈ F. Then Z−1(i) ⊃ T−1(i) for all i ∈ F, and
thus σZ(F) ⊂ σT(F). From the monotonicity of v it then follows that for every
F ⊂ N with h /∈ F it holds that
R(v, Z)(F) = v (σZ(F)) 6 v (σT(F)) = R(v, T)(F). (7)
These two properties together with dual monotonicity of u establish assertion
(a) in Theorem 2.11.
(b) Together with the properties shown under (a), R (v, Z) 6= R (v, T) now implies
that there exists some F ⊂ N with h /∈ F for which it holds that R(v, Z)(F) <
R(v, T)(F). Together with (a) and strong dual monotonicity of u this estab-
lishes assertion (b) in Theorem 2.11.
(c) Suppose that v is strictly monotone and that S is acyclic. Furthermore, suppose
that T (h) = ∅ or S is transparent. Then we show that there exists a team
F ⊂ N with h /∈ F for which it holds that R (v, Z) (F) < R (v, T) (F).
We now show that under these conditions S (h) \ T̂ (h) 6= ∅. First, suppose
that T (h) = ∅. Then T̂ (h) = ∅ and since h ∈ N \ WS it then follows that
S (h) \ T̂ (h) = S (h) 6= ∅.
Second suppose that S is transparent. Now, we proceed by contradiction and
assume that S (h)\T̂ (h) = ∅. Then S (h) ⊂ T̂ (h) and, thus, ∅ 6= S (h)\T (h) ⊂
T̂ (T (h)) ⊂ Ŝ (T (h)) ⊂ Ŝ (S (h)), implying that S (h) ∩ Ŝ (S (h)) 6= ∅. This
contradicts the transparency of S.
Next consider the team
F := T̂−1
(




S (h) \ T̂ (h)
]
. (8)
Remark that S (h)\T̂ (h) 6= ∅ implies that F 6= ∅. Since S is acyclic, T ∈ H (S) is
acyclic as well. This implies that h /∈ F. Furthermore, σT (F) = F ∈ ΦT. Thus,
since v is strictly monotone and F 6= ∅, it follows that R (v, T) (F) = v (F) > 0.
Finally, we note that σZ (F) ⊂ F \
[
S (h) \ T̂ (h)
]
since h /∈ F. Hence, since
S (h) \ T̂ (h) 6= ∅, σZ (F) 6= F, and thus by strict monotonicity of v it holds that
R (v, Z) (F) = v (σZ (F)) < v (F) = R (v, T) (F) . (9)
Assertion (c) of Theorem 2.11 now follows with assertions (a) and (b) shown
above and the strong dual monotonicity of the utility structure u in combina-
tion with Lemma 2.3.
This completes the proof of Theorem 2.11.
Proof of Theorem 3.3




i := S (i), i ∈ N.
(a) Let T ∈ M (v, S) and consider the corresponding strategy tuple ET. Let i ∈ N
be arbitrary. Now define
Z (j) =
{
T (j) for j 6= i
S (i) for j = i.
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By definition of the restriction R and monotonicity of v it now can be con-
cluded that R (v, Z) = R (v, S) = R (v, T). Hence, Z ∈ M (v, S).




be given, where Ei ⊂ S (i) is arbitrary. From dual
monotonicity of u, Theorem 2.11(a), and the definition of M (v, S) it now





= ui (R (v, T)) = ui (R (v, Z)) > ui (R (v, TE)) = u
0
i (E) .
Hence, since i ∈ N and Ei ⊂ S (i) are arbitrary, E
T ∈ N (Θ0).
(b) Let E ∈ Ns(Θ
0) and suppose that E 6= ES. Then there exists some j ∈ N with
Ej ⊂ S (j) , Ej 6= S (j). Now consider E := (E−j, S (j)), then by dual monotonic-




> u0i (E). This contradicts the






This completes the proof of Theorem 3.3.
Proof of Theorem 3.4
We develop the proof of Theorem 3.4 through a sequence of intermediate results.
These lemmas are put together to form a proof of the assertions stated in the two
main theorems.





, and let v be a monotone game.
Proof. For every E ⊂ N, let ∆v(E) be the Harsanyi dividends (see Harsanyi [21]), i.e.
they are uniquely determined by v(E) =
∑
T⊂E ∆v(T) for all E ⊂ N.
If T /∈ M (v, S) then there exist j ∈ N, h ∈ Ŝ−1(j) \ T̂−1(j) and H ⊂ N with
∆v(H) 6= 0, H ∩ T̂(h) = ∅ and H ∩ T̂(j) 6= ∅. (If such a j, h and H would not exist
then R (v, T) = R (v, S) and thus T ∈ M (v, S).) But then there exists a sequence of
agents h1, . . . , hp such that h1 = j, hp = h, hk ∈ S(hk+1) for all k ∈ {1, . . . , p − 1},
and j /∈ T̂(hk) for at least one k ∈ {2, . . . , p}. Let m ∈ {2, . . . , p} be the lowest label
for which j /∈ T̂(hm) and there exists H ⊂ N with ∆v(H) 6= 0, H ∩ T̂(hm) = ∅ and
H ∩ T̂(j) 6= ∅. (Note that such a label exists because it holds for label p.) Then, for
Z ∈ H (S) given by
Z (i) =
{
T (i) for i 6= hm
T(hm) ∪ {hm−1} for i = hm,
it holds that R (v, Z) 6= R(v, T). Since R (v, Z) (E) 6 R(v, T)(E) for all E ⊂ N, and
R (v, Z) (E) = R(v, T)(E) for all E ⊂ N with hm ∈ E, it follows from strong dual





The next lemma discusses situations in which the full authority structure S is (v, S)-
minimal.
Lemma A.2 Let u be a strongly dual monotonic utility structure and let S ∈ M̂ (v, S),
and v be a monotone game. Then
(a) ES ∈ Ns(Θ
0), and
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Proof. Under the assumptions, by definition, M̂ (v, S) = M (v, S) = {S}.




, where Ei ⊂ S (i) , Ei 6= S (i), is
arbitrary as well. The resulting authority structure is given by TE /∈ M (v, S).
Hence, R (v, TE) 6= R (v, S). From strong dual monotonicity of u and Theorem





= ui (R (v, S)) > ui (R (v, TE)) = u
0
i (E) .
Hence, ES ∈ Ns(Θ
0).
(b) This assertion follows from Lemma A.1 and the fact that S ∈ M̂ (v, S) implies
that T /∈ M (v, S) for all T ∈ H (S) with T 6= S.
¤
Now Theorem 3.4(a) follows immediately from Theorem 3.3(b) and Lemma A.2.





ET | T ∈ M (v, S)
}
is a simple consequence of the properties given in Theorem 3.3(a)
and Lemma A.1.
It remains to be shown that Ns(Θ
0) = ∅. From Theorem 3.3(b) it only remains
to be shown that ES is not a strict Nash equilibrium. Namely, by assumption there
exists some T ∈ M (v, S) with T 6= S. Then it follows that there is some j ∈ N with
T (j) ⊂ S (j) , T (j) 6= S (j). Consider the authority structure Z given by
Z (i) =
{
S (i) if i 6= j
T (j) if i = j.
From a repeated application of Theorem 2.11(a) it can be concluded that R (v, Z) =
R (v, S), i.e., Z ∈ M (v, S). Now it can immediately be concluded that ES cannot be a
strict Nash equilibrium of the authority game Θ0.
This completes the proof of Theorem 3.4.
Proof of Theorem 3.5
We first prove the following lemma.
Lemma A.3 Let u be a strongly dual monotone utility structure and v be a monotone
game. For every (v, S)-minimal authority structure T ∈ M̂ (v, S) there exists a cost
level cT > 0 such that E
T ∈ N (Θc) for every 0 6 c 6 cT.
Proof. Let T ∈ M̂ (v, S) be (v, S)-minimal. Then by Theorem 2.11(a) and (b) we have

























Ej ⊂ S (j) such that











|T (j)| + 1
∣∣∣∣ j ∈ N \ WS with δj > 0
}
> 0. (10)




with Ei ⊂ S (i). Now we consider two cases:
Case A R (v, T) = R (v, TE)
Then by definition of (v, S)-minimality of T it follows that |T (i)| 6 |Ei|. Hence











− u0i (E) + c (|Ei| − |T (i)|)
= c (|Ei| − |T (i)|) > 0.
Case B R (v, T) 6= R (v, TE)









> u0i (E). Hence, δi > 0. Let 0 < c < cT. Now we











− u0i (E) + c (|Ei| − |T (i)|)
> δi − cT |T (i)| > 0.
Cases A and B now complete the proof of the assertion stated in Lemma A.3. ¤
Next we turn to the proof of Theorem 3.5. Consider any E ∈ Γ such that TE /∈
M̂ (v, S). We now distinguish two possible cases:
Case A: TE /∈ M (v, S)




. Hence, there exists some jE ∈ N \ WS with
u0jE (E) < u
0
jE























− u0jE (E) + c (|EjE | − |S (jE)|)
> (cE − c) |S (jE)| > 0.
Thus, E /∈ N (Θc).
Case B: TE ∈ M (v, S)




. Since TE /∈ M̂ (v, S), we conclude
from the definition of the restriction R that there exists some T̂ ∈ M̂ (v, S) with∣∣∣T̂ (i)
∣∣∣ 6 |TE (i)| for all i ∈ N and
∣∣∣T̂ (j)
∣∣∣ < |TE (j)| for some j ∈ N \ WS. Also
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Hence, E /∈ N (Θc).




∣∣∣ T ∈ M̂ (v, S)
}
∪ {cE | E ∈ Γ with TE /∈ M (v, S) } > 0.
Now for any 0 < c < c∗ it follows that
(i) from Lemma A.3:
{
ET
∣∣∣ T ∈ M̂ (v, S)
}
⊂ N (Θc), and
(ii) from Case A and Case B: N (Θc) ⊂
{
ET
∣∣∣ T ∈ M̂ (v, S)
}
.
This completes the proof of Theorem 3.5.
Proof of Theorem 4.2
The proof of Theorem 4.2 is based on results from the theory of social situations,
developed in Greenberg [17]. Greenberg develops the notion of a stable standard
of behavior as the main equilibrium concept within this theory. In this proof we
transform our notion of a stable authority protocol into a stable standard of behavior
of an appropriately constructed social situation. The proof of the existence of the SAP
then becomes an application of the main existence theorem developed by Greenberg.
Let (v, S, u) and c > 0 be as in Theorem 4.2. Hence, v ∈ GN is a monotone game
and S ∈ SN is an acyclic authority structure. Furthermore, (v, S, u) does not have
any inessential agents. We now construct a social situation from (v, S, u). (For an
exhaustive discussion and definition of a social situation we refer to Chapter 2 in
Greenberg [17], in particular Definitions 2.1.1 and 2.1.3.)
First, for every T ∈ H (S) we define
XT =
{
R (v, Z) ∈ GN
∣∣ Z ∈ H (S) and Z (i) = T (i) for all i ∈ ψ′ (T)
}
,
for every i ∈ N the restricted utility function fTi : X
T → R is given by fTi (w) =
ui (w) − c |T (i)| for every w ∈ X
T, and for every E ⊂ N and w ∈ XT we define
γT (E, w) =
{
γi (T) if E = {i}
∅ otherwise
where γi is the veto correspondence for agent i ∈ N.








defines a social situation intro-
duced by Greenberg [17]. We now develop the proof of Theorem 4.2 through a series
of intermediate results.
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From the definition of an Optimistically Stable Standard of Behavior13 (OSSB)
and a stable authority protocol the next lemma follows trivially. A proof is therefore
omitted.
Lemma A.4 Any OSSB of the social situation Ωc corresponds to an SAP for (v, S, u).
Furthermore, any SAP for (v, S, u) corresponds to an OSSB of social situation Ωc.
The set of positions in Ωc corresponds to the set of authority structures H (S) in the
authority situation. For the next lemma we remark that the notions of hierarchical
and strictly hierarchical social situations are given in Definitions 5.1.1 and 5.3.2 in
Greenberg [17].
Lemma A.5 The social situation Ωc is strictly hierarchical.
Proof. Let n0 := |N \ WS| and let for every k ∈ {0, 1, . . . , n0}
Pk := {T ∈ H (S) | |ψ (T)| = n0 − k } .
Clearly, P0 = {T0} and Pn0 = {T ∈ H (S) | T (i) 6= ∅ for i ∈ N \ WS}. Now, the collec-
tion {P0, . . . , Pn0 } forms a partition of H (S). Also, from above γ
T (E, w) = ∅ for all
E ⊂ N and w ∈ XT if T ∈ Pn0 .
Let k ∈ {0, 1, . . . , n0 − 1} and take T ∈ Pk. Then for every i ∈ ψ (T) and w ∈ X
T obvi-
ously γT ({i} , w) ⊂ Pk+1, since |ψ (T
′)| = |ψ (T)| − 1 for T ′ ∈ γT ({i} , w). Furthermore,
















is indeed a social situation. Hence, Ω satisfies requirement H.1 of Definition 5.1.1
in Greenberg [17], pages 43–44. Furthermore, requirement H.2 of that definition is
satisfied as well by Ωc. So, Ωc is indeed hierarchical.
Finally we observe that there is no E ⊂ N and w ∈ XT for which T ∈ γT (E, w).
Hence, Ωc satisfies Definition 5.3.2 in Greenberg [17], page 52. ¤
The next lemma follows immediately from Lemma A.5 and Corollary 5.3.3 in Green-
berg [17], page 52. A proof is therefore omitted.
Lemma A.6 The social situation Ωc admits a unique OSSB σc∗ : H (S) → 2
XT .
Assertion (a) of Theorem 4.2 now follows immediately from Lemmas A.4 and A.6.
To show assertion (b) as well, we define for T ∈ H (S) and h ∈ ψ(T) the authority
structure Th ∈ H (S) by
Th (i) =
{
T (i) if i ∈ N \ {h}
S (i) if i = h,
and π(T) = {h ∈ ψ(T) | uh(R (v, Th)) − uh(R (v, T)) > 0}.
Lemma A.7 Let the utility structure u be strongly dual monotone, let there be at
least one agent i ∈ N with S(i) 6= ∅, and let c := minT∈H(S),h∈π(T){uh(R (v, Th)) −
uh(R (v, T))}. For c
∗ := c
maxi∈N |S(i)|
it then follows that
13For the definition of an Optimistically Stable Standard of Behavior, or OSSB, we again refer to
Greenberg, Section 2.3 and Definitions 2.4.1, 2.4.2, and 2.4.3.
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1. c∗ > 0, and
2. c∗ = 0 if and only if R (v, T) = R (v, S) for all T ∈ H (S) .
Proof. From the definition of c∗ the fact that u satisfies strong dual monotonicity,
and Theorem 2.11(a) it immediately follows that c∗ > 0.
It is also easy to see that c∗ = c = 0 if R (v, T) = R (v, S) for all T ∈ H (S) .
Now suppose that R (v, T) 6= R (v, S) for some T ∈ H (S) . Then there exists a T ∈
H (S) and h ∈ ψ(T) such that R (v, Th) 6= R (v, T). Since u satisfies strong dual
monotonicity it follows from Theorem 2.11(b) that uh(R (v, Th)) − uh(R (v, T)) > 0.
But then c > 0, and thus c∗ > 0. ¤
Our final step in the proof of assertion (b) in Theorem 4.2 is the following:
Lemma A.8 Let the utility structure u be strongly dual monotone and let the monitor-
ing cost satisfy c < c∗, where c∗ is as defined in Lemma A.7. Then for every T ∈ H (S)
the unique OSSB σc∗ of the social situation Ω
c is given by σc∗ (T) ≡ {R (v, Z)} where
Z ∈ SN is given by
Z (i) =
{
T (i) if i /∈ ψ (T)
S (i) if i ∈ ψ (T) .
Proof. The proof consists of two steps, constituting a proof by induction on the
partition discussed in the proof of Lemma A.5.
First, let T ∈ Pn0 . Using the notion of the Optimistic Dominion given in Greenberg
[17], page 19, and Greenberg [17] Definition 2.4.7 plus the fact that γT (E, w) = ∅
for all E ⊂ N and w ∈ XT, we compute the unique OSSB for Ωc to be given by
σc∗ (T) = X
T = {R (v, Z) |Z ∈ H (S) and Z (i) = T (i) , i ∈ N } .





Z (i) = T (i) for i /∈ ψ (T)
Z (i) = S (i) for i ∈ ψ (T)
}





Z (i) = T (i) for i /∈ ψ (T)
Z (i) = S (i) for i ∈ ψ (T)
}
Let T ∈ Pk−1. Choose h ∈ ψ (T) and let Z ∈ H (S) be given by
Z (i) =
{
S (i) if i = h
T (i) otherwise.
Note that T (h) = ∅. Since, u is strongly dual monotone, it follows by definition
of c∗ that uh (R (v, Z)) − uh (R (v, T)) >
c
|S(h)|
> c∗ if R (v, Z) 6= R (v, T). Since
R (v, Z) ∈ XT∩γT ({h} ,R (v, T)) and c < c∗ it can be concluded that R (v, T) /∈ σc∗ (T)





Z (i) = T (i) for i /∈ ψ (T)
Z (i) = S (i) for i ∈ ψ (T)
}
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From Theorem 2.11(b) it also follows that this inclusion can be reversed as well. This
shows the assertion. ¤
To complete the proof of Theorem 4.2 we remark that from Lemma A.8 it can imme-
diately be concluded that for 0 6 c < c∗ it holds that
Σc∗ (T0) = σ
c
∗ (T0) = {R (v, Z) | Z (i) = S (i) for i ∈ N } = {R (v, S)} .
Hence, we have established assertion (b) of Theorem 4.2. Since we already estab-
lished assertion (a), we have completed the proof of Theorem 4.2.
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